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Introduction 
The focus of this paper is the contemporary conditions for major international oil 
companies’ (IOCs) investment in oil producing states, with particular focus on their 
current and future potential for success in Iraq. The main argument is that major Anglo-
American IOCs will not be able to establish a firm foothold in Iraq, a country with the 
world’s third largest oil reserves, although many analysts predicted this to take place. In 
the first part of this paper, I argue that major IOCs are in crisis, as they face difficulties 
replacing their oil reserves, and are struggling to compete with national oil companies 
(NOCs). In order to improve their overall situation, many analysts point to Iraq as the 
IOCs’ ‘Promised Land’. They also argue that due to government-business vested 
interests, Anglo-American IOCs are helped by the US and UK governments in getting the 
best possible oil exploration and production deals with the Iraqi government. The 
February 2007 draft Iraqi Oil Law is an oft cited example. However, the historical record 
indicates that there are no vested interests between Big Oil and their home governments. 
Thus, the new legislation drafted by the Iraqi government, which is very attractive for 
foreign investors and IOCs in particular, was not influenced by Anglo-American 
corporate and government pressure, but simply by the Iraqi government’s inability to 
secure sufficient investment funds to increase oil production capacity. Moreover, building 
on Alhajji’s seminal 2003 analysis, I argue that even if this law passes the Iraqi 
parliament, this will not automatically imply long-term success for the IOCs due to 
various political and security factors, legal uncertainty, competition from NOCs, and the 
likely ‘obsolescing bargain’. Thus, in reality, the future of Anglo-American IOCs in Iraq 
does not look promising, and rather than ‘Promised Land’, Iraq should be considered 
their reality check.  
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Big Oil in Trouble 
Big Oil has a big problem. However, at first glance, this proposition appears doubtful. 
Exxon Mobil has been reporting the largest earnings in the history of business, notching 
up US$8.4 billion in its first quarterly report of 2006. The combined 2006 profits of 
Exxon Mobil, BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Chevron, ConocoPhillips and Total amount to 
US$135.4 billion, a sum greater than the GDP of the Czech Republic or Israel.1 Why 
would one need to be concerned about their future? 
 
Currently, the major IOCs are in a particularly challenging situation. The oil industry 
faces challenges that could ultimately wipe out some, or most of major IOCs, once 
venerated as the Seven Sisters.2 The biggest companies and remnants of the original 
Seven Sisters, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, BP and Chevron, may be running out of 
good ways to invest their money. Examples of these weaknesses are as follows: Royal 
Dutch/Shell claims its reserves fell in 2004 and 2005 because it only found enough oil to 
replace 19% of what the company produced in 2004 and 67% of production in 2005.3 BP 
told the US stock exchange that it replaced only 89% of its production in 2004, and 95% 
in 2005.4 Even the mighty Exxon Mobil failed to replace all of its reserves in 2005, and 
Chevron’s reserves also shriveled compared to a year earlier (see Table 1).5 In the oil 
industry, “reserve replacement is the best guide to whether a company will be able to 
maintain – or grow – production in the future.”6 According to PFC Energy Chairman J. 
Robinson West, “it is becoming increasingly difficult to find attractive ways to reinvest 
today’s profits,” and it will not get easier since drilling prospects are finite.7 A healthy 
reserve replacement ratio is over 100%. However, ratios for most of the six major IOCs 
have been below that level (see Table 1), and will likely remain there over the next five 
years.8 Although cash-rich due to today’s surge in the oil price (see Table 2), these 
companies are opportunity-poor as their aging reserve base badly needs topping up,9 and 
they will all begin seeing production declines by 2009.10 Buried beneath their record 
profit figures for 2004, 2005, and 2006 are worrying signs of a business in decline. 
Analysts from McKinsey and Company consultancy have suggested that the “Big Oil 
confronts its most far reaching test in decades,” as “the top five companies – Exxon 
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Mobil, BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Chevron and Total – face increasingly tough challenges 
finding new sources of oil and natural gas to replace existing reserves.”11 
 
Table 1: Major IOCs’ Crude Oil and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) Reserves (2002-
2005) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Exxon Mobil 12,623 12,856 11,651 11,229 
BP 7,762 7,449 7,550 7,161 
Total 7,231 7,323 7,003 6,592 
Chevron 6,494 6,280 5,511 3,626 
Royal Dutch/Shell 5,782 5,009 3,745 3,466 
Total Majors 39,892 38,917 35,460 32,074 
Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005, 
Vienna, Austria: Ueberreuter, 2006, p. 129. 
 
Table 2: World’s Largest Public Oil and Gas Companies by Profits (2006) 
R Company Profits (US$ billion) Headquarters Location 
1 Exxon Mobil 39.5 US 
2 Royal Dutch/Shell 25.4 Netherlands/UK 
3 BP 22.3 UK 
8 Chevron 17.1 US 
10 PetroChina 16.5 China 
11 ConocoPhillips 15.6 US 
12 Total 15.5 France 
17 Petrobras 12.1 Brazil 
16 ENI 12.2 Italy 
24 Gazprom 10.8 Russia 
Source: 'The Forbes Global 2000: The World’s Biggest Public Companies', Forbes, 16 April 2007. Notes: 
R – world ranking if in top 25; majority private companies in bold. 
 
Furthermore, despite high profits IOCs’ returns on capital were flat between 2000 and 
2006. According to Goldman Sachs the average integrated Western oil company will earn 
a 19% return on capital employed in 2006, up only about 2% since 2000.12 In the 
supremely capital-intensive oil industry, return on capital is a key measure because it 
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reflects not just how much profit a company has made, but the cost of earning it. The 
bottom line is that value creation by oil companies is stagnating. While IOCs are making 
more than ever before, they are also spending unprecedented amounts to generate those 
profits. Overall production by the oil majors is struggling to keep up with demand, and 
the reserve replacement ratio, the measurement of how well they are replenishing their 
supplies, is slipping.  
 
The biggest obstacle the majors face in replacing their reserves is the ultimate peculiarity 
of the oil business. Oil is the only industry in which the cheapest to produce oil reserves 
and largest assets, those located in Russia and OPEC countries, are not in the hands of the 
most efficient and best-capitalised firms.13 These reserves are controlled by NOCs where, 
in most cases, the government owns and self-finances the entire operation from reserves 
to pipelines – the “Saudi Aramco model.”14 In numerous countries, foreign investment in 
energy exploration and production (‘upstream’) activities is banned or saddled with 
strong disincentives.15 Although some have suggested that resource nationalism is 
moribund,16 this is clearly not the case in the oil industry, when one considers that oil 
producing and exporting states own and control at the very least three-quarters, if not 
90% of total proven world oil reserves.17  
 
Thus the problem for major IOCs, according to Fatih Birol of the IEA, is not that there is 
not enough oil but that there are not enough opportunities to find oil.18 For example, two-
thirds of the wells drilled worldwide from 1997 to 2003 were in North America, where 
production is falling, while the Middle East, which holds the bulk of the world’s proven 
reserves of conventional oil, accounted for only 2% of global investments, and remains 
off limits to international investors. Much of the majors’ production today comes from 
large fields in places such as Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, which are 
now entering the phase of rapid decline.19 Desperate IOCs are now looking for growth in 
such places as West Africa, the Caspian, Venezuela, Russia, Canada’s tar sands and the 
ultra-deep waters off Brazil. Nevertheless, this new wave of oil exploration is proving 
tricky and dangerous due to some countries’ complex oil formations and unforgiving 
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environments that require costly up-front capital expenditure, and mostly due to 
unreliable legal frameworks and political risks in many of these countries.20 
 
Major IOCs also face increasing competition. NOCs have grand ambitions: they are 
competing with the majors by developing new oil reserves overseas and investing in 
international refining and retail activities. The lack of technology, capital and markets, 
often seen as reasons for NOC privatisation, are now easily available through NOCs from 
oil importing (China, India, Brazil) and exporting countries (Malaysia’s Petronas, 
Norway’s Statoil) who are expanding internationally. Independent operators like BHP 
Billiton, Talisman Energy and Apache as well as oil-service companies such as 
Halliburton and Schlumberger also offer these services. About two-thirds of the world’s 
oil reserves are found in the Middle East, where foreign firms are mostly unwelcome ever 
since the nationalisations that took place three decades ago. In world’s list of top twenty 
oil companies by reserves (see Table 3), the top nine companies are fully state-owned and 
Exxon Mobil, the top ranked major, is fifteenth.21 
 
Table 3: Top 20 Oil Companies, by Reserves (2005) 
Company Based In State Ownership 
(%) 
Reserves (Billion 
Barrels) 
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100 262.7 
NIOC Iran 100 132.5 
INOC Iraq 100 115.0 
KPC Kuwait 100 99.0 
ADNOC UAE 100 97.8 
PdVSA Venezuela 100 77.2 
Libya NOC Libya 100 39.1 
NNPC Nigeria 100 35.3 
Gazprom Russia 73 18.4 
Lukoil Russia 8 16.0 
Qatar Petroleum Qatar 100 15.2 
Rosneft Russia 100 15.0 
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Pemex Mexico 100 14.8 
Sonatrach Algeria 100 11.8 
Exxon Mobil US - 11.2 
Petrobras Brazil 32 11.2 
PetroChina China 90 11.0 
BP UK - 7.1 
Total France - 6.6 
Chevron^ US - 5.3 
Sources: The Economist, 30 April 2005; OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005, p. 129. ^Including 1.7 
billion barrels of recently acquired UNOCAL. 
 
Besides low reserve ownership of 2.7% of the world total, the majors in 2005 produced 
only 39% of their sales volume,22 and just 13-15% of global oil production.23 Major 
Western IOCs as a whole have full access to countries with only 6% of the globe’s 
known reserves, mainly in North America and Europe, and can also invest in countries 
that own an additional 11% of reserves through join ventures (JVs) or production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs).24 It is worth mentioning that as late as 1972, the Seven Sisters 
controlled 91% of Middle Eastern production and 77% of the non-communist world’s oil 
reserves outside the United States.25 According to Øystein Noreng, until about 1970, 
integrated trading represented perhaps 85-90% of international oil trade.26 In the past, 
major IOCs – with their leading-edge technology, unrivalled expertise in managing 
complex projects, and deep pockets had a clear edge in negotiations with the national 
governments in control of energy resources. However, these advantages have evidently 
become less pronounced, thereby weakening their position at the negotiating table. In 
addition, the loss of supply base following nationalisations subsequently reduced the 
volume and significance of integrated trading. Nowadays competition from NOCs in 
unexpected places, such as the middle of the Sahara which was the exclusive preserve of 
the Big Oil, is a major challenge facing IOCs. 
 
Iraq: Big Oil’s ‘Promised Land’? 
When considering the difficulties that the major IOCs are facing, the possibility of 
establishing a presence in Iraq is something that many of them have long desired. Oil in 
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Iraq is particularly attractive to major IOCs for three reasons. Firstly, Iraq possesses the 
world’s third largest proven oil reserves, as of 2006 estimated at 115 billion barrels, or 
9.5% of world total.27 Many experts believe that Iraq has additional undiscovered oil 
reserves, which may double or triple the total when serious prospecting resumes, and 
thus, Iraq may turn out to have reserves larger than Saudi Arabia.28 Moreover, as world 
oil demand increases and as oil reserves in other areas are depleted, Iraq’s share of global 
proven reserves will increase because it has been producing below capacity from 
decades.29 Since its peak in 1979, Iraq’s oil production consistently stood at below 5% of 
world’s total oil production, and in recent years it dropped to as low as 2% (see Figure 
1).30 In 2006, Iraq produced 2.5%, and yet it controlled close to 10% of world’s oil. If 
Iraq’s proven reserves meet high-end estimates in the 300-400 billion barrel range, these 
reserves could reach 30% of global oil reserves by mid-century or earlier.31 
 
Figure 1: Iraq’s Oil Production and Reserves as of World Total (1979-2006) 
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Source: British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, June 2007. 
 
Secondly, Iraq’s oil is generally of high quality because it has attractive chemical 
properties, notably high carbon content, lightness and low sulphur content, that make it 
particularly suitable for refining into value-added products. For these reasons, Iraqi oil 
commands a premium on the world market.32 Finally, Iraq’s oil production costs are 
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amongst the lowest in the world, making it highly attractive for potential investors. Costs 
are extremely low because Iraq’s oil is deposited in enormous fields that can be tapped by 
relatively shallow wells, producing a high ‘flow rate’. In 2002, Western IOCs estimated 
that they could produce a barrel of Iraqi oil for less than US$1.50 and possibly as low as 
US$1.00, including all exploration, oilfield development and production costs, while still 
receiving a 15% return. According to a 2004 Energy Intelligence study, it cost US$2.50 a 
barrel to develop oil in Iraq, compared with US$4.00 a barrel in Saudi Arabia, US$4.50 a 
barrel in Iran and US$7.00 a barrel in Russia. Thus, the cost of oil production in Iraq is 
lower than in virtually any other country.33 Since major IOCs are facing enormous 
difficulties in replacing their reserves, the vast Iraqi oil fields, with little prospecting 
required, offer nearly free acquisition. Given Iraq’s appeal and the IOC’s need for reserve 
replenishment, their interest is self-evident. 
 
Prior to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and subsequent regime change, Iraq has been 
closed to Anglo-American IOCs due to economic sanctions and Saddam Hussein’s 
preference for investors from other countries, such as Russia, France, Germany, and 
China. Thus, many analysts argue that unlike Saddam’s regime, a new ‘friendly’ 
government would favour US and UK firms at the expense of Russian, French, Chinese, 
and other companies, which signed oil exploration and production contracts between 
1991 and 2003 with Saddam Hussein’s regime.34 The starting point of these analysts is 
that the US and UK governments’ interests are closely related to those of major IOCs 
with headquarters in these two countries. In recent years, many have suggested that there 
exists a close relationship between the Bush Administration and the oil companies. This 
is because many high profile politicians in this administration, in past worked for, and are 
still closely related to the energy industry.35 Some more far-fetched analyses suggest that 
the major American IOCs hijacked the current administration, and have been using it to 
further their interests.36 At minimum, the Bush Administration is closely aligned and 
acting in concert with the IOCs. Arguably as a result of these vested interests the new 
Iraqi regime, under American and British pressure, opened up Iraqi oil industry to foreign 
investment which favours and Anglo-American IOCs.37 The 2007 draft Iraqi Oil Law 
was, according to one analyst, “drafted, behind locked doors, by a US consulting firm 
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hired by the Bush administration and then carefully retouched by Big Oil”. Therefore, it 
will be highly favourable to Anglo-American IOCs, as they are to gain access to at least 
64% of Iraq’s major fields and enjoy profit rates of up to 75%. Iraq’s oil wealth will go 
through “no less than institutionalised raping and pillaging.”38 Big Oil has been described 
as “ecstatic” as it was set to “profit handsomely and long-term, 30 years minimum, with 
fabulous rates of return.”39 
 
Back to Reality 
While major Anglo-American IOCs would certainly have no objections to the above 
scenario, it is far from reality for a variety of reasons. To begin with, and as will be 
illustrated below, there is no evidence to suggest vested government-business interests in 
general and in particular regarding Iraqi oil between the US/UK governments and Anglo-
American IOCs. Furthermore, the Iraqi government does not seek to open up its oil 
industry to foreign investment because of Anglo-American corporate-government 
pressure, but due to the fact that after decades of war and sanctions Iraqi oil industry is in 
dire need of investment and reconstruction. Below, after discussing these propositions, I 
highlight the various difficulties that major Anglo-American IOCs are likely to face 
before and after establishing their presence in Iraq. 
 
The IOCs are very large and politically powerful private actors,40 whose primary 
objective is profit maximisation.41 This objective often differs from primary objectives of 
the IOCs’ home state governments. The activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
in general create a variety of problems for home countries or states in which a foreign 
MNC has its headquarters.42 Conflict between MNCs and their home states often arises 
over various issues, such as taxation, trade policies, security issues, and economic 
sanctions, where MNCs often disagree with and/or do not want to follow policies pursued 
by their home governments.43 Moreover, Western governments do not necessarily benefit 
from the foreign activities of their MNCs, and this is primarily due to differing interests 
between the government and the MNC. Lack of national identity within MNCs plays a 
role too, since MNCs in general appear to be losing their national identities and loyalties 
as they increasingly view markets from a global and not local perspective.44 Raymond 
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Vernon has shown that even in the early 1970s, although US-based MNCs were 90% or 
more American by equity ownership, they were just 25% American by sources of funds, 
less than 1% American by the identity of employees, and practically 100% foreign by the 
identity of the governments that receive their taxes.45 Thus, foreign sources of funds, 
foreign employees, taxes paid in foreign countries, and the very fact that these companies 
function in many different countries result in differing interests to those of their home 
governments. 
 
When considering such background, some have suggested that although it depends on 
private companies to develop reserves and supply the nation with oil at a profit, the US 
government does little to support its private oil companies both home and abroad, and the 
only edge the US oil companies have over NOCs is their superior technology.46 
According to Joe Barnes, “history provides countless examples of Washington sacrificing 
the interests of US oil companies to broader goals.”47 For example, according to Stephen 
Krasner, in the early 1970s US oil companies wanted political support from the state 
against the threat of nationalisation of their assets that was being placed on them by Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and other Middle Eastern oil producers. However, American oil companies 
received no serious support from the US government. Without state support, the oil 
companies could not resist pressure from even weak states and thus they failed to prevent 
nationalisation of their assets and subsequent oil price increases. Thus, by the mid-1970s 
the oil industry had to move to accommodate itself to OPEC.48 US policy-makers were in 
this instance more concerned with keeping a lid on the political situation, and maintaining 
the authority of conservative governments, such as that of Shah in Iran and the Saudi 
monarch, than they were with the prerogatives of the oil companies.49 Similar 
development, as shown by Krasner, occurred when American central decision-makers 
turned a deaf ear to oil company entreaties for more vigorous official backing in Peru and 
Mexico before World War Two.50 
 
Moreover, American IOCs were the primary losers after voluntary, and later mandatory, 
oil import quotas were established in the US in the 1950s, as they could import very 
limited quantities of internationally produced oil.51 Historically, it was against American 
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IOCs’ interests to go to Iran after Mossadeq was overthrown in 1953. However, they 
agreed to do so, but only after the government anti-trust suit against them was 
downgraded by executive order from a criminal to a civil action, and after heavy pressure 
from the US security concerns about Iran potentially falling to the Communist bloc if oil 
production did not resume.52 In an unrelated incident, the United States was impotent in 
using Gulf Oil, an American oil company, to further its own interests in the 1976 civil 
war in Angola. After only a brief hesitation, Gulf Oil turned over several hundred million 
dollars to the winning, communist side, even though the US government had backed their 
enemies and had not yet recognised the victor.53  
 
In another example, American IOCs involved in a number of Middle Eastern states 
clearly did not support the US tilt towards Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.54 In 
yet another example, Vernon argues that the 1970s oil crisis provided evidence that 
governmental use of IOCs as arms of public power had its limits. In the oil crisis, these 
limits were swiftly reached, as none of the developed countries succeeded in obtaining 
greatly preferred treatment from the oil companies it thought of as its own, though a 
number of governments tried.55 Some have even suggested that during the oil crisis the 
US government threatened to nationalise Exxon, along with other IOCs, based on a belief 
that they caused a severe increase in oil prices.56 Thus, Vernon argued that the realisation 
that IOCs cannot be used simply as an extended arm of government was a lesson half-
learned by the governments involved in the oil crisis of the 1970s.57 Home governments 
should have learnt this lesson in the 1940s, when oil companies successfully used their 
advantage in the Congress to block government’s efforts to use them to further security of 
Middle East oil supplies during World War Two.58 
 
In recent years, major US IOCs have been vehemently opposed to official US policy on 
Iran, Sudan or Libya (until recently) and Iraq, which prohibited them from investing in 
these oil rich countries.59 The bottom line is that “whenever national governments use 
multinational enterprises as an executive arm carrying out national policies, they must 
recognise that the enterprises on which they rely have interests that extend beyond the 
borders of any single country.”60 Thus, after considering plentiful historical evidence, 
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which indicates a lack of common interests between Big Oil and home governments, it is 
clear that suggestions that the US and UK governments occupied Iraq primarily to enable 
their IOCs to gain access to lucrative oil deals is unjustified. For example, to illustrate 
this divergence of interests in the case of Iraq, according to A. F. Alhajji, fearing the 
consequences, “the oil companies never supported the invasion.”61 The fact that Iraq was 
subject to comprehensive trade sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 687 of March 1991 
as well as other Security Council resolutions basically meant that Anglo-American 
companies were legally locked out of Iraq. Meanwhile, despite the UN sanctions, 
Russian, French, and Chinese oil companies, backed by their respective national 
governments, were prepared to negotiate with the Iraqi regime under the ‘oil-for-food’ 
program established under UNSCR 986, and were thus not bound by sanctions.62 If the 
US and UK governments’ interests regarding Iraq converged with those of Anglo-
American IOCs, they would have lifted sanctions imposed on Iraq. Such a move would 
have allowed Anglo-American oil companies to compete with other companies, and 
invest in Iraq without the US and UK having to go to war, and that was certainly in the 
companies’ interests.63 
 
In late February 2007 the Iraqi cabinet approved a draft law favourable to IOCs because 
its oil industry desperately needs investment due to decades of destruction and 
negligence, not because of ‘orders’ from American and British governments in 
collaboration with their IOCs. The US Government stated that it “did not provide any 
drafting input to the recent hydrocarbon law; the Iraqis have not asked for that kind of 
assistance on that law or on the revenue sharing law.”64 Iraq is unable to independently 
finance the increase of its oil production capacity to a modest 3 million barrels per day 
(bpd), and let alone more optimistic targets of 4.5 to 12 million bpd.65 Capacity expansion 
requires tens of billions of dollars to develop the Iraqi oil fields and build infrastructure.66 
A part of the reason why Iraq cannot finance capacity expansion may be the fact that 
approximately US$12 billion of Iraqi oil revenue appropriated by the post-Saddam 
regime has disappeared in the form of bribery, over-charging, embezzlement, product 
substitution, bid rigging and false claims.67 The lack of financial resources has forced the 
Iraqi government to finance capacity expansion by either borrowing from international 
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lenders or by sharing the fields with IOCs. However, Alhajji notes that Iraq cannot obtain 
loans from international financial houses, international institutions, and other 
governments since none of the conditions that financial institutions use as criteria to 
determine loan eligibility exist in Iraq.68 Iraq is one of the most indebted countries in the 
world,  and it cannot pay its current debt or even service it.69 If banks agree to provide 
loans, they will demand collateral and loan guarantees, usually in the form of future oil-
export revenues. However, Iraqi oil revenues have already been slated to pay debt and 
Gulf War damages and to rebuild Iraq. Thus, Iraqi authorities have little money to invest 
in the oil sector, given pressing humanitarian and reconstruction needs.70 The US and its 
allies can play a crucial role in building Iraq’s oil production capacity by providing 
grants, loan guarantees and free technical assistance. However, local politics in the US 
and UK prevent their governments from providing any considerable grants and loan 
guarantees.71 Arguably, the only remaining option for Iraq is to finance the expansion of 
oil production capacity through investment by IOCs, which are to be lured by the recently 
drafted investment law.72 This law, very favourable for IOCs, aims at inviting the 
necessary foreign investment Iraq needs to jump-start its economy. 
 
Although this law appears extremely promising for IOCs, numerous factors may prevent 
them from fulfilling this promise. PSAs and other favourable types of contracts are the 
most practical way to revamp the Iraqi oil industry and increase production capacity, but 
results will take time. The Iraqi government faces serious problems, which ought to be 
solved in order to become an attractive and safe destination for foreign investment. The 
harsh reality of Iraq today is that solving these problems will require a long time. 
Moreover, besides the likelihood of some future Iraqi government renegotiating contracts 
with foreign investors, IOCs are also not the only companies interested in Iraqi oil, as 
Chinese NOCs are likely to offer some staunch competition. This challenge is analysed 
below. 
 
The Anglo-American occupation of Iraq must end to enable Anglo-American IOCs to 
sign long-term contracts, and Iraqi PSAs or other model contracts would be valid for 
thirty years, thus, long-term. The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits a belligerent 
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occupier from signing long-term contracts, but allows the occupier to sign short-term 
contracts to provide services to the occupied population.73 Even if the US and the UK 
violate and disregard international law and allow for long-term contracts, since long-term 
contracts would be signed while Iraq is under occupation, they would not be legally 
binding.  In the early 1950s, when Mossadeq nationalised Iranian oil industry, British 
lawyers for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP) contested the action in the 
International Court in The Hague and lost despite Britain’s superpower status. Similarly, 
in the future, Iraqi lawyers could argue that any oil deal signed while Iraq was occupied 
was done under duress and thus was invalid.74 International law is unlikely to bind the 
new Iraqi government to the contracts awarded by the occupying power to foreign parties 
during occupation. After the occupation, the new Iraqi government will have the sole 
discretion to uphold or reject these contracts, whether partially or in whole.75  
 
Legal uncertainty, political instability and fears about the safety of personnel have forced 
major oil companies to delay sending their representatives to Baghdad, which shows that 
their pre-invasion fears materialised. Sir Philip Watts, chairman of Royal Dutch/Shell 
amplified these concerns in July 2003 by saying  
The safety of our people is paramount. There has to be proper security, 
legitimate authority and legitimate process . . . by which we will be able to 
negotiate agreements that would be longstanding for decades. We would not 
go into that situation unless these conditions were satisfied because we are a 
long-term business doing long-term projects and we need the framework in 
which we can make this sort of investment decision.76  
 
Thierry Desmarest, Total’s chief executive, indicated that Total will participate in the 
development of Iraqi oil fields once Iraq is stable. “We need a stabilised legal framework, 
which means a recognised government defining very clearly the contractual regime under 
which the contracts can be signed for 20 to 30 years.”77 Additionally, US Energy 
Secretary Samuel Bodman said in July 2006 that US companies are not interested in 
investing in the country before the security situation improves.78 
 
Furthermore, according to Alhajji, political stability, an appropriate institutional 
framework, and policies that promote and protect foreign investment will not emerge 
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overnight. Realisation of these preconditions for long-term investment will take time that 
is measured in years, if not decades.79 Once a legal government, political stability, and an 
appropriate institutional framework are established, additional time is needed to build 
infrastructure that can help attract foreign investment. Historical evidence from Kuwait, 
Iran, and Iraq indicates that even with the availability of capital, building infrastructure 
after a war requires a long period of time.80 Current Iraqi infrastructure cannot handle 
much more than 2 million bpd, and building infrastructure to allow handling of modest 3 
million bpd, let alone anything over that level, will take political and legal stability, and 
security, which is something that Iraq is far from achieving. 
 
Since Iraq is almost land-locked (only 58 km of coastline on the already crowded Gulf), 
time will be needed to negotiate international agreements with bordering countries in 
order to transport Iraqi oil via pipelines. Alhajji argues that negotiations with these 
countries may take years to conclude, and hostile attitude of one or more neighbouring 
countries would limit the expansion of Iraq’s oil export capacity.81 In addition, 
negotiations to finalise the oil contracts and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) that 
the deposed Iraqi government signed between 1991 and 2003 will take time. Before the 
invasion, there were 27 companies operating or signed contracts worth US$38 billion 
with Iraq.82 These contracts must be evaluated and re-approved by the Federal Oil and 
Gas Council. Some of these contracts, especially the large and lucrative ones, if not re-
approved, may end up in international courts. Legal action would likely delay 
development of Iraqi fields for a few years, as IOCs are generally reluctant to develop 
any disputed fields.  
 
Moreover, time is needed to reach an agreement among various Iraqi political groups on 
the allocation of oil proceeds. Even if they reach an agreement, implementation will be 
difficult and may create tension, political turmoil, and possibly a halt in oil production.83 
Moreover, one of the main problems that will confront future Iraqi governments is how to 
resolve the dispute with Kuwait over the shared oil fields that played a main role in the 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. For example, the al-Retqa oil field in Kuwait overlaps with 
the al-Rumailah field in Iraq. Developing these fields requires an agreement between both 
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countries, and such agreements require lengthy negotiations over political, economic, and 
technical issues. Ratification by the parliaments of both countries would cause further 
delays. The output from these shared fields will fall below their optimal level in the 
absence of agreement between the two countries.84 
 
Although Iraq’s cabinet approved the new PSA law, the nation’s 275-member parliament 
is yet to approve the draft. Some have suggested that this is far from certain since the 
draft framework legislation is highly contentious. In particular, there is pressure from the 
powerful Oil Workers Union of Basra, which in 2005 staged strikes objecting to 
America’s plan to privatise Iraq’s oil industry. Political opponents include the Iraqi 
National Slate Party; a reviving Communist Party; and much of the Iraqi press.85 Thus, 
rather than promote reconciliation, the new law may “contribute to deeper political 
tension.”86 Moreover, even if the law passes Iraqi parliament, it may not last. Since the 
Iraqi government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis IOCs and foreign governments is currently 
low, they proposed a law, which aims at attracting foreign investment, rather than a law 
similar to Iranian ‘buyback’ contracts, which is often criticised by IOCs for not enabling 
them to book reserves. Proposed Iraqi PSAs completely break from normal practice in the 
region where all major oil-producing industries are in the public sector, and thus Iraq 
would be the only major Middle Eastern producing nation where production is controlled 
by foreign companies. Issues over terms of cooperative contracts between host states and 
MNCs arise quite often due to “the inherent instability of any negotiated settlement.”87 
For example, according to Matthew Bell, large-scale infrastructure concessions-contracts 
that are typically designed to last 15-30 years are renegotiated on average after only 2.1 
years.88 In 1972, Iraq nationalised its oil industry,89 and as Iraq rebuilds and gains 
bargaining power, very little will stand on some future Iraqi government’s way in 
changing investment laws. An Iraq no longer occupied will seek better terms for any deal 
reached under the proposed law.  
 
Theoretically, Raymond Vernon’s obsolescing bargain model (OBM) is useful in 
explaining MNC-host government bargaining power dynamics,90 and is thus useful for 
understanding future bargaining power dynamics between Iraqi government and IOCs. 
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OBM explains the changing nature of bargaining relations between an MNC and host 
country government as a function of goals, resources and constraints on both parties, and 
numerous authors from a wide ideological spectrum have endorsed this argument.91 In 
OBM, which is seen as a positive-sum game in which the goals of the MNC and host 
state are assumed conflicting, the initial bargain favours the MNC, but as MNC assets are 
transformed into hostages, relative bargaining power rapidly shifts to the host state over 
time. Once bargaining power shifts to the host state, its government imposes more 
conditions, such as higher taxes or asset expropriation, on the MNC. The original bargain 
obsolesces, giving OBM its name. Moreover, it is important to note that IOCs suffer from 
a major structural vulnerability, what Theodore Moran refers to as the “hostage effect,” 
which is associated with large sunk capital.92 Thus, after investing heavily in a particular 
host country’s oil industry, IOCs, unlike manufacturing investors, cannot easily threaten 
to exit due to capital-intensive nature of oil extraction, which imposes high barriers to 
exit, even if the host state revises the bargain.93 Hence, this option will usually be the one 
of last resort, and in the future, as IOCs’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the Iraqi government 
obsolesces, they would have to settle for considerably worse conditions in order to 
maintain their presence in Iraq.94 
 
A further factor which limits the potential for future IOC success in Iraq is that the 
improvement of security situation in Iraq, which IOCs regard as crucial for investing in 
the country, is far from reality considering that civil war is ravaging the country. 
Moreover, the continuous sabotage campaign against oil production and transportation 
facilities enhances inhospitable investment climate for IOCs.95 For example, between 
April 2003 and October 2005, there were 282 documented attacks against existing oil 
infrastructure in Iraq by those opposed to the US occupation or seeking to destabilise the 
new Iraqi regime.96 The lack of adequate security poses a major challenge for the 
government in the oil sector. Persistent political instability and violence, and sabotage of 
oil facilities, continuously impede IOC entry into Iraq, and the British decision to 
withdraw most of its troops from the south, where the largest oilfields are located, has 
raised additional security concerns.97 
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Enter China 
Finally, IOCs are not the only companies interested in Iraq’s oil. NOCs from oil 
importing countries, and particularly from China, which as argued above provide staunch 
competition to IOCs, are just as interested in establishing their presence in Iraq. Chinese 
NOCs—CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC—are spending billions of dollars on a global 
scramble for oil to feed China’s booming economy. They have the ability to obtain 
government loans at little or no interest. Driven by the government’s energy security 
policy, which is aimed at developing multiple import sources and route diversification 
and building up reserves to avoid unexpected interruption,98 China’s NOCs have acquired 
growing equity oil stakes and long-term crude oil contracts, and have signed ‘strategic’ 
alliances in many regions of the world.99 In doing so, they have repeatedly emerged 
victorious vis-à-vis major Anglo-American IOCs in bidding and negotiations and have 
thus provided IOCs with unwanted competition in many oil-producing and exporting 
countries.100 
 
Chinese NOCs’ success is exacerbated by the fact that in general, oil importing countries’ 
NOCs are favoured by host governments since, according to John Mitchell and Glada 
Lahn, they “carry less ‘imperialist’ baggage than Western governments or companies”.101 
Thus, investment from foreign NOCs, rather than IOCs, is politically more palatable for 
the host government. In relation, due to “cultural proximity between NOCs and host 
countries,” NOCs can better understand how to work through a bureaucratic system of a 
host country than IOCs.102 Moreover, many host governments, such as those in Sudan, 
Myanmar, Iran, and others, are attracted by the fact that China’s government agencies 
and financial institutions do not apply conditions, such as the UN Global Compact, 
regarding transparency and external monitoring of operations affecting human rights and 
ethical issues to loans and aid packages associated with oil deals.103 Therefore, oil 
importing countries’ NOCs are clearly advantaged vis-à-vis major IOCs in their dealings 
with many non-Western host governments, and likely with Iraq in the future.  
 
Thus, when considering their recent success and aggressiveness, Chinese NOCs will offer 
much competition to Anglo-American IOCs in Iraq, and may even be preferred by the 
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Iraqi government. Moreover, they may not be deterred by the lack of security in the 
country, as they are already heavily involved in Sudan, despite of the civil war. 
Unsurprisingly, a Chinese company is considering sending Chinese oil workers into Iraq, 
despite of the security risks.104 This shows that Chinese NOCs are much more willing to 
take considerable risk than IOCs. Indicative of Chinese willingness to establish a foothold 
in Iraq, is that in October 2006, CNPC began renegotiating a US$1.2 billion contract 
signed in 1997 with Saddam Hussein’s government to develop the large al-Ahdab field, 
in an area where Shiite militias hold sway. As a result of these negotiations, in June 2007, 
Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al Shahristani stated that this contract “is still valid” and that 
the current Iraqi government “will honor it”.105 
 
Conclusion 
This article did not seek to evaluate policy options or propose recommendations for the 
Iraqi government regarding investment in Iraq’s oil industry. Rather, the focus here was 
on major Anglo-American IOCs’ investment opportunities in host countries, with 
particular focus on their prospects in Iraq, after taking into account recent developments 
in that Middle Eastern country. In their global operations, major Anglo-American IOCs 
are facing problems with booking reserves, and are struggling to respond to increasing 
competition from NOCs. Similar to the situation in other major oil-producing countries, 
their future looks bleak in Iraq despite initial optimism. Besides continuous and, very 
likely, indefinite insecurity and political and legal uncertainty, which at present all inhibit 
their entry into Iraq, if the situation improves and they establish their presence there, 
Anglo-American IOCs are likely to face staunch competition from Chinese NOCs, which 
have already triumphed over major IOCs in bidding with many oil-producing 
governments. Moreover, they are likely to face an almost certain ‘obsolescing bargain’ 
with a future Iraqi government. In practice, this ‘obsolescing bargain’ would be similar to 
the scenario, which in recent years has been taking place in Venezuela, as President Hugo 
Chávez unilaterally renegotiated Venezuela’s contracts with IOCs present in the country. 
Due to the ‘hostage effect’ of their investments and the lack of alternative investment 
opportunities, IOCs had no choice but to remain loyal to Chávez and not to voice their 
concerns. In summary, the problems, which major Anglo-American IOCs are facing, and 
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which are evident in Venezuela, Russia and elsewhere, are unlikely to be solved in Iraq. 
Rather, in reality, the situation in Iraq is likely to exacerbate the IOCs’ weaknesses. 
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